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ii. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appeallate jurisdiction in this 
Divorce matter pursuant to Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953. Appellant recites Rules 52(a) and 63(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure as the basis for appeal of Judge Schofield's Order. 
Appellee concurs that the rules apply to the subject matter of 
Appellant's appeal, but argues that Appellant's arguments do not 
warrant overturning Judge Schofield's decision. 
1. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLEES ARGUMENT 
X. 
While Gail is not happy with Judge Schofield's findings, he 
made reasoned decisions based upon the evidence presented to him by 
both parties. Ronald has failed to demonstrate that Judge 
Schofield abused his discretion and rendered a decision that was 
prejudicial to him. 
II. 
The Judge did not violate the Code of Judicial Conduct in 
refusing to recuse himself, and in so doing, he avoided further 
prejudice to each party, inasmuch as Ronald's Request for Recusal 
of Judge Schofield, can only be interpreted as an act of reprisal 
against the judge for his earlier order finding Ronald in contempt 
of the Court for his refusal to pay Court ordered alimony. 
III. 
The Court acted within its discretion to impute income to 
Ronald for purposes of determining revised child support and 
alimony. 
IV. 
The Court did not err in refusing to terminate alimony. Judge 
Schofield properly evaluated the evidence before the Court and made 
a well reasoned decision to modify alimony after weighing the 
financial evidence provided by each party, and their respective 
needs. 
2. 
mmam 
"' !• -^ 
RONALD'S APPEAL OF JUDGE SCHOFIELD'8 DECISION URGES THE COURT 
OF APPEALS TO FIND THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND 
THAT HIS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WERE INCONSISTENT WITH HIS FINDINGS, 
BUT RONALD HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
JUDGE ERRED. 
It is clear from the Findings of Fact v" *-ue «-r*^l court that 
the disputes between Ronald and Gai ~iginated eeember, 1992, 
when Gail filed 
filed numerous Motions ior Order ^ •• ause against one another 
for failure to | -^ .~^r«- . ^bligat:-^^ *-• - ^  ^ h p r ; Ronald has 
hired and fire ,
 r 
stipulated modifications ot child support and spousal 
suppor finally Gail filed her latest Motion for Order to Show 
Cause on delinquent clii Id
 S Upp 0j H ' p HI II jll I i II > H 
his Motion for Modification,, of child support and termination i -
After numerous delays
 (l I.Iu' 11adr J iu) 
reduce child support and terminate alimony was convened 
SippfFmbei I'll, I i Id i ri.tlhl lliiinl I i i eci his attorney 01 i uuae 4, 1995 
and proceeded t c. • represent himself pro se. 
Each party presented evidence with respect to their employment 
suppor t, debts, and « jointly owned 
business. 
Ronald argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted the 
ml dii"(Hiii' I herefrom, i intenable conclusions. On 
the contrary, Judge Schofield carefully deliberated upon the income 
evidence provided by Ronald and he concluded, from these limited 
records provided by Ronald, that there appeared to be significant 
discrepancies between claimed expenses of Gail and Ronald. The 
judge evidenced considerable thought in deliberating upon this 
limited financial evidence submitted by Ronald, to arrive at what 
he deemed a fair and equitable solution to the child support 
modification issue. 
Ronald would urge this Court to accept his self serving 
interpretation of his tax statements, which, incidently, were the 
only evidence of his income available to the trial court. He did 
not provide the trial court with any documentation or receipts to 
support and explain the tax returns. 
The trial court heard the testimony of both parties, 
evaluated the available evidence and made an equitable decision 
based upon the evidence before it. Ronald would have this Court 
question Judge Schofield's reasoning and urges that the trial court 
misread documentary evidence. Ronald accuses the trial court of 
somehow manufacturing a basis for an order of child support and 
alimony not otherwise justified. 
Utah's position on this very question has been stated and re-
stated in numerous recent cases. In a landmark case similar to 
this, the Supreme Court of Utah held: 
An award of alimony, or modification thereof, is within the 
sound discretion of the Court, and will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the findings of the Court, or there has been a misapplication 
of the law, or the Court has clearly abused its discretion. 
Adams v. Adams,593 P.2d 147 (1979) 
4. 
In 1988, this Court of Appeals perpetuated the holding in 
Smith v, Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (1988), that: 
In divorce actions, the trial court has considerable 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests 
of the parties Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah ct. 
App.1987), and we will not disturb its decision unless it 
is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. 
In the case on appeal, the trial court rightfully exercised 
its "considerable discretion" in calculating and imputing income to 
Ronald upon which a reduction of child support and alimony was then 
ordered. 
The trial court essentially ruled in Ronald's favor, however 
Ronald wanted more. Just because a party does not get everything 
he asks for, is not a basis for the argument that the trial court 
was arbitrary and committed reversible error. This Court should 
not reverse the trial court, because there was no abuse of 
discretion and the decision of the trial court was clearly just, 
not unjust. 
II. 
The trial court adhered to the Code of Judicial Conduct and 
did not violate Rule 63 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, inasmuch 
as the trial court fully advised both parties, through counsel, of 
a conversation about the case with his daughter, and advised 
counsel that he did not believe he needed to recuse himself. Both 
counsel agreed that recusal was not warranted, however Ronald, 
after being found in contempt of the court for refusal to pay 
alimony, fired his attorney, and filed his Request for Recusal in 
what appears to be an act of reprisal against the judge. 
Judge Schofield informed both parties, through their 
respective counsel on April 25, 1995, that he had a conversation 
with his daughter about the case pending between Ronald and Gail. 
Judge Schof ield proactively revealed the entire conversation to the 
5. 
parties and advised the parties that he did not believe that the 
conversation, or his daughter's employment with R.C. Willey with 
one of Gail's daughters# would, in any way, create any bias or 
prejudice that would affect his neutrality or objectivity in this 
case. He further gave each party the opportunity to file the 
appropriate motion for recusal. Both attorneys agreed that 
recusal was not warranted. 
On May 30, 1995, the trial court held Ronald in contempt of 
court for failure to pay court ordered interim alimony. Ronald did 
not appear at that hearing, but his attorney did. This hearing was 
convened after Ronald had filed a Petition to modify the Decree 
with respect to alimony and child support, and then filed an 
amended petition, and Gail had filed a Motion for Order to Show 
Cause alleging nonpayment or underpayment of interim alimony. 
On June 5, 1995, Ronald fired his attorney and filed his 
Request for Recusal of Judge Schofield. Ronald accused Judge 
Schofield of unconscious bias in favor of Gail. Ronald does not 
describe the bias he alludes to, however one must conclude that 
Ronald was referring either to Judge Schofield granting a 
postponement of the April 26, 1995 trial date, or his holding 
Ronald in contempt of Court for failure to pay court ordered 
alimony. 
Neither of those actions by Judge Schofield were 
inappropriate. A basis for postponement was presented by counsel 
and the judge acted within his discretion to grant counsel's 
request. It was the first postponement of the trial. With respect 
6. 
to the contempt order, it was clear that Ronald had failed to pay 
$2,000.00 in alimony, to which he had stipulated in January, 1995. 
The judge found him in contempt, ordered him to pay $350.00 for 
Gail's attorney fees incurred to bring the Motion and appear at the 
Order to Show Cause Hearing, and reserved further sanctions to the 
time of trial. Clearly Judge Schofield acted appropriately, and as 
any other judge might have, under the circumstances. 
Judge Schofield gave both parties a timely notice of his 
conversation with his daughter and both parties had an opportunity 
to timely request Judge Schofield's recusal. Both parties declined 
to take such action. Only after being held in contempt, did Ronald 
seek recusal, and the effect thereof would have been to further 
delay resolution of this case, which had already absorbed a great 
deal of the time and attention of the court. 
Judge Schofield received Ronald's request and considered it in 
light of Canon 3.E.(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which 
states: 
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in 
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned 
including but not limited to instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning 
a party or a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias 
involving an issue in a case, or personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. ... 
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within 
third degree of relationship to either of them, or the 
spouse of such a person: . . . 
(iii)is known by the judge to have a more than 
de minimis interest that could be substantially 
affected by the proceeding. 
Clearly, Judge Schofield's Ruling upon Ronald's petition 
carefully considered the potential for bias, and he rightfully 
7. 
concluded there was none. Moreover, he considered the consequences 
of Ronald's Petition, if granted, upon the timely resolution of 
this oft delayed and convoluted case. He concluded that his 
recusal would be prejudicial to the interests of both parties. 
Ronald cites Barnard v. Murohv,882 P.2d, 679 (1994) as the 
guideline for recusal and argues that Judge Schofield did not 
adhere to that established guideline and therefore his decision 
should be reversed. 
While the Court in Barnard seems to indicate that once a party 
calls into question the trial judge's neutrality, he must either 
recuse himself or refer it to another judge, to avoid the potential 
for mischief in the event of any actual bias, surely it did not 
intend that Rule 63 (b) be spuriously used to cause delay or to 
reverse an unfavorable decision. 
In this case, Ronald made no effort to have Judge Schofield 
recuse himself at the time the judge revealed that he had the 
conversation with his daughter, and Judge Schofield did not believe 
the conversation was of a nature as to require that he disqualify 
himself in accordance with Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Counsel for Ronald did not feel that recusal was warranted at the 
time the discussion was revealed by Judge Schofield. Certainly if 
Ronald believed the judge to be biased against him, the time to 
seek recusal was at the time the supposed prejudicial communication 
took place, not forty-one days later after being held in contempt. 
Given the nature of the communication between Judge Schofield 
and his daughter, it should be evident that had Judge Schofield 
8. 
referred this matter to another judge, the Petition would have been 
found lacking in merit, and Judge Schofield would have proceeded 
with the trial. 
If the Judge erred, by not referring Ronald's Petition for 
Recusal to another judge for review, the error was harmless, and 
the ultimate decision of the trial court would remain the same. 
Because Ronald has failed to prove bias on the part of the 
trial court, and based upon Judge Schofield's reasoning as 
manifested in his Findings of Fact, it should be evident that the 
decision of the trial court would have been essentially the same, 
had Judge Schofield referred this matter to another judge or not. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has consistently held with respect 
to harmless error as follows: 
Supreme Court may reverse trial court judgment only if there 
is reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would 
have been a result more favorable to the complaining party. 
Matter of Estate of Kesler. 702 P.2d 86. (1985) 
The Supreme Court arrived at the same conclusion in 1980 when 
it held: 
Reviewing court does not reverse the judgment merely because 
there may have been some error or irregularity; reversal 
occurs only if the error or irregularity is such that there is 
a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have 
been a result more favorable to the complaining party. 
Lee v. Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance Service, 606 P.2d 259 
(1980). 
Moreover, Rule 61 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, 
and no error or defect in any ruling or order in anything done 
or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground 
for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment 
or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
9. 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. 
III. 
The trial court has discretion to determine income for the 
purposes of establishing child support obligations. 
The trial court was presented with income tax returns by 
Ronald as the sole credible evidence of his income, which, he 
claimed was less than when he first stipulated to child support. 
He had stipulated to pay $533.00 per child per month in child 
support in January, 1994, and on August 10, 1994, just seven months 
later, he petitioned the court for a significant reduction in child 
support, due to his material change in circumstances, to wit: he 
had experienced a decline in income. 
Judge Schof ield, received the only evidence of income provided 
by Ronald, and determined therefrom, that he was, in fact, entitled 
to a modification of his child support obligation. Ronald was not, 
however, satisfied with the amount of the reduction. As in the 
determination of alimony, the trial court has wide latitude and 
discretion to ascertain a party's income for purposes of 
establishing child support obligations, especially when the 
evidence is less than precise as to the party's actual income. 
In a 1990 Utah case, similar in some respects to the case upon 
appeal, the defendant, on appeal, claimed that the trial court's 
findings of fact regarding alimony and child support were 
unsupported by the evidence and the trial court erred in allocating 
the parties' resources. This Court of Appeals held: 
10. 
Under Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5 (1989), the trial court 
has broad equitable power to order child support, taking into 
account the needs of the children and the ability of the 
parent to pay . . . Defendant again claims the court erred in 
failing to enter a specific finding regarding defendant's 
income. Without such a finding, defendant claims, the court 
cannot determine an appropriate level of child support. We 
disagree. The trial court considered the evidence and 
assessed the credibility of defendant's testimony. Given the 
evidence, the court determined that defendant was either 
understating his actual income or had chosen employment which 
paid less than he could otherwise earn. WE DEFER TO THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ASSESSMENT THAT DEFENDANT HAD AN ABILITY TO 
EARN MORE THAN HE PURPORTED TO EARN AND FIND NO ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION IN THE COURT'S AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THAT ASSESSMENT, (emphasis added) . Oscruthorpe 
v. Oscruthorpe, 8 0-4 P. 2d 53 0 (Ut .ah ft pp 1 990) 
In the case on appeal
 il( the trial court made a reasonable 
based upon the evidence provided by Ronald, and this Court should 
likewise defer to that assessment by Judge Schofield. 
The trial court has broad discretion in awarding alimony and 
was not bound to enter an order modifying the award of alimony to 
the date the Petition for Modification was filed. 
Ronald urges that the court erred by not terminating alimony 
after finding that Ronald's income had mater 
UciiiJ ti.icil completed school iiinull h.iiri himitd hull t Line employment. The 
trial court did find that Ronald's income had decreased and that 
Gail could earn an income sufficient to support hersel o 
the lev eJ s* iff i ci ei i It: I: :: p a > her expenses, caused in some measure by 
her reliance on Ronald to pay alimony as earlier stipulated to by 
him. 
In properly evaluating the evidence before it; Ronald's 
ability to pay, and Gail's need for some alimony, the judge 
exercised its discretion in granting, in part, Ronald's request for 
reduction of alimony, and likewise, exercised its discretion in 
determining when said reduction would be effective. 
As with the award of child support, the Court, in Oscruthorpe 
v. Osauthorpe. 804 P.2d 530, (Utah App. 1990). held at page 533: 
Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding alimony. Davis 
v. Davis, 749 P.2d. 647, 649 (Utah 1988) We will not disturb 
the trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court 
exercises its discretion within the standards set by the 
Court. Id. In determining alimony, the trial court must 
consider three factors: 1) the financial conditions and needs 
of the receiving spouse; 2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and 
3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
If the trial court considers these factors, this court will 
not disturb the alimony award unless such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
No such abuse of discretion occurred at the trial level. 
Judge Schofield clearly considered the financial conditions of both 
Ronald and Gail; he evaluated Gail's ability to pay her expenses, 
and Ronald's ability to support Gail. That he imputed income to 
Ronald, which Ronald claims he does not have, was clearly within 
the trial judge's discretion, and he set forth, in detail, his 
reasoning for such imputation of income and there can be no 
question that the judge acted fairly and equitably and no serious 
inequity has resulted therefrom. 
Ronald also argues that the judge misunderstood the law in not 
granting relief, retroactive to August 10, 1994 rather than to 
January, 1995. He cites Section 30-3-10.6, Utah Code Annotated, as 
12. 
the authority for making the order modifying alimony retroactive to 
August 10. R P M 11(111! ! nil I'll in in Utah Lode Annotatec i / • 
A child or spousal support payment under a child support 
order,MAY, be modified with respect to ANY PERIOD DURING 
WHICH, a petition for modification is pending (emphasis 
added). 
* court not required to modify the award of alimony 
rathei Jie discretion judge be made 
retroactive >eriod during which the petition for 
1
 I'llii'iiI" e c i b t 1 11. "I Illimi I Judqe Sn l i u ! in, e,l til 
did, based upon the facts and accordance with fairness and 
equity. 
CONCLUSION 
Any error the trial court may have committed, in not complying 
with Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was harmless error 
iriuisniim,")! lis Rona M l;a;i ic?«i;l i, MI i-. j In , I urden of showing obvious 
bias and inequity. Moreover, Ronald did not make a timely Petition 
for recusal and only after Judge Schofield found him 111 contempt 
MI Ronald tile such a petition. .-
It would be an expansion beyond the intent of the legislature 
and the Court " permit the use of Rule 63(b) to thwart the timely 
; ,/e as a means of reprisal against 
a judge rendered an unwelcome finding of contempt. 
With respect * arguments proffered by Appellant, 
1h(."y" i * ni l In ill iasmuch • court is afforded 
wide latitude and discretion to ascertain income and one's ability 
to pay child support and alimony, and so long 3 
the authority for making the order modifying alimony retroactive to 
August 10. Section 30-3-10.6# Utah Code Annotated says: 
A child or spousal support payment under a child support 
order,MAY, be modified with respect to ANY PERIOD DURING 
WHICH, a petition for modification is pending (emphasis 
added). . • 
The court is not required to modify the award of alimony 
retroactive to the date the petition for modification was filed, 
but rather it may, in the discretion of the trial judge be made 
retroactive to any period during which the petition for 
modification is pending. That is precisely what Judge Schofield 
did, based upon the facts and in accordance with fairness and 
equity. 
CONCLUSION 
Any error the trial court may have committed, in not complying 
with Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was harmless error 
inasmuch as Ronald failed to sustain his burden of showing obvious 
bias and inequity. Moreover, Ronald did not make a timely Petition 
for recusal and only after Judge Schofield found him in contempt 
for non-payment of alimony, did Ronald file such a petition. 
It would be an expansion beyond the intent of the legislature 
and the Court to permit the use of Rule 63(b) to thwart the timely 
progress of litigation and to serve as a means of reprisal against 
a judge who rendered an unwelcome finding of contempt. 
With respect to all other arguments proffered by Appellant, 
they are without merit, inasmuch as the trial court is afforded 
wide latitude and discretion to ascertain income and one's ability 
to pay child support and alimony, and so long as that discretion is 
13. 
abused so as to render * patently unfair and inequitable 
resuj. 
decision. 
Gail elects not to address the issue of contempt which Ronald 
has raised upon appeal, as I liiil \i\v in is solel >' Ibel \ ;r»t>n Uona IcJIII a n ill 
Court and does not materially bear upon Gail. 
Wherefore, the Appellee, Gail Monks respectfully asks the 
Court of Appeals to reject Ronald's appea eeping 
intact the judgment entered by Judge Schofield on January 22nd, 
1996. 
addition, Gail has been required tu obtain vt njnse I ILo 
respond Ronald's appeal and therefore she requests an award 
ag-i-- Ronald for her attorney fees and costs xn uno amount of 
$100C I. 
Dated October 11, 1996. 
Gregory, Johnson & Barton, 
Attorneys for Gail Monks, 
D. Richard Smith 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
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